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Abstract—The accelerated digitalisation of society along with
technological evolution have extended the geographical span
of cyber-physical systems. Two main threats have made the
reliable and real-time control of these systems challenging: (i)
uncertainty in the communication infrastructure induced by
scale, openness and heterogeneity of the environment and devices;
and (ii) targeted attacks maliciously worsening the impact of
the above-mentioned communication uncertainties, disrupting the
correctness of real-time applications.
This paper addresses those challenges by showing how to build
distributed protocols that provide both real-time with practical
performance, and scalability in the presence of network faults
and attacks. We provide a suite of real-time Byzantine protocols,
which we prove correct, starting from a reliable broadcast
protocol, called PISTIS, up to atomic broadcast and consensus.
This suite simplifies the construction of powerful distributed
and decentralized monitoring and control applications, including
state-machine replication. Extensive empirical evaluations show-
case PISTIS’s robustness, latency, and scalability. For example,
PISTIS can withstand message loss (and delay) rates up to 40%
in systems with 49 nodes and provides bounded delivery latencies
in the order of a few milliseconds.
Index Terms—real-time distributed systems, probabilistic
losses, consensus, atomic broadcast, Byzantine resilience, intru-
sion tolerance.
I. INTRODUCTION
The accelerated digitalisation of society has significantly
shifted the way that physical infrastructures—including large
continuous process plants, manufacturing shop-floors, power
grid installations, and even ecosystems of connected cars—
are operated nowadays. Technological evolution has made it
possible to orchestrate a higher and finer degree of automation,
through the proliferation of multiple sensing, computing, and
communication devices that monitor and control such infras-
tructures. These monitoring and control devices are distributed
by nature of the geographical separation of the physical
processes they are concerned with. The overall systems, i.e.,
the physical infrastructures with their monitoring and control
apparatus, are generally known as cyber-physical systems
(CPS) [24]. However, transposing the monitoring and control
functionality normally available in classical, small-scale and
homogeneous real-time and embedded systems, to the wide-
scale distributed CPS scenarios mentioned above, is a very
challenging task, due to two main reasons.
First, the scale and frequent openness of the environment,
as well as the heterogeneity of devices (sensors, actuators and
gateways), induce uncertainty in the communication infrastruc-
ture interconnecting them, itself often diverse too, e.g., Blue-
tooth, Wireless IEEE 802.11, or Fiber [19, 30, 15, 10]. These
communication uncertainties become evident [30, 15, 10],
namely in the form of link faults and message delays, which
hamper the necessary reliability and synchronism needed to
realize real-time operations, be it when fetching monitoring
data or when pushing decisions to controllers.
Second, security vulnerabilities of many integrated devices,
as well as the criticality of the managed physical structures,
increase the likelihood of targeted attacks [27, 20]. Such
attacks can aim to inflict inconsistencies across system compo-
nents or to disrupt the timeliness and correctness of real-time
applications. The consequences of such attacks can range from
loss of availability to severe physical damage [29].
This paper addresses the challenges mentioned above, which
render traditional approaches for building real-time communi-
cations, ineffective in wide-scale, uncertain, and vulnerable
settings. We investigate, in particular, how to build large-scale
distributed protocols that can provide real-time communication
guarantees and can tolerate network faults and attacks. These
protocols simplify the construction of powerful distributed
monitoring and control applications, including state-machine
replication for fault tolerance. To our knowledge, literature,
with the exception of [8, 21], has targeted achieving either
real-time guarantees or Byzantine-resilience with network un-
certainties, but not both.
To bridge this gap, we present a protocol suite of real-
time Byzantine protocols, providing several message delivery
semantics, from reliable broadcast (PISTIS1), through consen-
sus (PISTIS-CS), to atomic broadcast (PISTIS-AT). PISTIS is
capable of: (i) delivering real-time practical performance in
the presence of aggressive faults and attacks; and (ii) scaling
with increasing system size. The main idea underlying PISTIS
is to have every process adopt an event-triggered approach
using digital signatures to constantly monitor how well it is
connected to the rest of the network. Connectivity among
processes is measured thanks to the broadcast messages:
processes embed signed monitoring information within the
messages of the broadcast protocol and exclude themselves
from the protocol when they are a threat to timeliness. Hence,
PISTIS does not modularly build on membership/failure de-
tector oracles (like in traditional distributed computing) but
rather directly incorporates such functionalities within. In fact,
modularity in this sense was proven to be impossible for
algorithms implementing PISTIS-like guarantees [21]. In order
to mask network uncertainties in a scalable manner, PISTIS
uses a temporal and spatial gossip-style message diffusion with
fast signature verification schemes.
We empirically show that PISTIS is robust. For example
PISTIS can tolerate message loss rates of up to 30%, 40%,
and 50 % in systems with 25, 49, and 73 nodes respectively:
PISTIS has a negligible probability of being unavailable under
such losses. We also show that PISTIS can meet the strict
timing constraints of a large class of typical CPS applications,
mainly in SCADA and IoT areas, such as: release and status
changes (time constants ≤ 10ms); fast automatic interac-
1PISTIS was a Greek goddess who represented the personified spirit
(daimona) of trust, honesty and good faith.
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tions (≤ 20ms); power system automation and substation
automation applications (≤ 100ms); slow speed auto-control
functions (≤ 500ms); continuous control applications (≤ 1s);
and operator commands of SCADA applications (≤ 2s). Such
SCADA and IoT applications could include up to hundreds of
devices where reliable and timely communication is required.
By using PISTIS as the baseline real-time Byzantine reliable
broadcast protocol, we prove that (and show how) higher-level
real-time Byzantine resilient abstractions can be modularly
implemented, namely, consensus and atomic broadcast. In-
terestingly, we prove that this can be realized with negligible
effort: (1) we exhibit classes of algorithms which are amenable
to real-time operations by re-using existing synchronous algo-
rithms from the literature; and (2) we rely on PISTIS, which
addresses and tolerates the most relevant problems posed by
the communication environment, including the impossibility
of modularly handling membership/failure detection [21].
In short, this work makes the following contributions:
• The PISTIS protocol suite provides several message de-
livery guarantees (from reliable to atomic). First, PISTIS
itself is an event-triggered real-time Byzantine reliable
broadcast algorithm that has higher scalability and faster
message delivery than conventional time-triggered real-
time algorithms, in the presence of randomized and un-
bounded network disruptions. Building on top of PISTIS,
we present classes of algorithms, PISTIS-CS and PISTIS-
AT, that respectively implement real-time Byzantine con-
sensus and atomic broadcast.
• Correctness proofs of the PISTIS protocol suite. For space
reasons, we provide the main proof results in this paper,
while exhaustive proofs are deferred to Appx. B.
• Extensive empirical evaluations showcasing PISTIS’s ro-
bustness, latency, and scalability, based on a C++ imple-
mentation in the Omnet++ [25] network simulator.
Roadmap. The rest of the paper is organized as follows.
Sec. II discusses related work. Sec. III details our system
model. Sec. IV recalls the properties of a real-time Byzantine
reliable broadcast, and presents our algorithm, PISTIS, in
details. Sec. V shows and proves how real-time Byzantine
atomic broadcast and consensus can be realized on top of PIS-
TIS’s guarantees using classes of existing algorithms. Sec. VI
evaluates the performance and reliability of PISTIS. Finally,
Sec. VII concludes the paper. For space limitations, proofs and
additional material are deferred to Appendices.
II. RELATED WORK
This paper has evolved from, and improved over, a research
line paved by [8, 31, 21] on timing aspects of reliable
broadcast and Byzantine algorithms. Besides these works, the
literature on broadcast primitives, to the best of our knowledge,
either does not take into account timeliness and maliciousness
or addresses them separately.
Cristian et al. [8] assumed that all correct processes remain
synchronously connected, regardless of process and network
failures. This strong network assumption is too optimistic, both
in terms of scale and timing behaviour, which in practice
leads to poor performance (latency of approximately 2.4
seconds with 25 processes—see Table I in Sec. VI-D for more
details). Moreover, Cristian et al.’s system model does not
allow processes that malfunction (e.g., by violating timing
assumptions) to know that they are treated as faulty by the
model. Our algorithm, in comparison, provides latencies in
the range of few milliseconds and our model makes processes
aware of their untimeliness.
Verissimo et al. [31] addressed the timeliness problem by
weak-fail-silence: despite the capability of the transmission
medium to deliver messages reliably and in real-time, the
protocol should not be agnostic of potential timing or omission
faults (even if sporadic). The bounded omissions assumption
(pre-defined maximum number of omissions) of [31] could not
be taken as is, if we were to tolerate higher and more uncertain
faults (as we consider in this paper): it could easily lead to
system unavailability in faulty periods. Hence we operate with
much higher uncertainty levels (faults and attacks).
Kozhaya et al. [21] devised a Byzantine-resilient algorithm
that provides an upper bound on the delivery latency of
messages. This algorithm is time-triggered and relies on an
all-to-all communication that limits the algorithm’s scalability.
Our work improves over [21] on several points: (i) we reduce
the delivery latency (few milliseconds as shown in Fig. 7 and
Fig. 8 compared to a few hundred as shown in [21, Fig. 8]—
see also Table I for a comparison of worst case latencies)
by adopting an event-triggered approach instead of a round-
based one; (ii) we improve the system’s scalability (at least
5 times less bandwidth consumption) by adopting a gossip-
based dissemination instead of an all-to-all communication;
and (iii) we show how real-time broadcast primitives can be
modularly used to build real-time Byzantine-resilient high-
level abstractions like consensus and atomic broadcast.
Guerraoui et al. [18] designed a scalable reliable broadcast
abstraction that can also be used in a probabilistic setting
where each of its properties can be violated with low probabil-
ity. They achieve a scalable solution by relying on stochastic
samples instead of quorums, where samples can be much
smaller than quorums. As opposed to this work, our goal is
to design a deterministic abstraction where the property are
never violated: RTBRB is deterministic because late processes
become passive, and therefore count as being faulty.
In [5, 6], the authors present a Byzantine fault-tolerant
SCADA system that relies on the Prime [3] protocol to ensure
both safety and latency guarantees. As opposed to PISTIS,
Prime relies on an asynchronous primary-based BFT-SMR
protocol. As opposed to Prime, PISTIS-CS and PISTIS-AT al-
gorithms are designed modularly from a timely reliable broad-
cast primitive; and PISTIS allows slow connections between
any processes in a probabilistic synchronous environment,
while Prime relies on the existence of a “stable” timely set
of processes. See ?? for further details.
III. SYSTEM AND THREAT MODEL
A. System Model
Processes. We consider a distributed system consisting of
a set Π = {p0, p1, ..., pN−1} of N > 1 processes. We assume
that processes are uniquely identifiable and can use digital
2
signatures to verify the authenticity of messages and enforce
their integrity. We denote by σi(v) the signature of value v
by process pi. We often write σi, when the payload is clear
from the context. Processes are synchronous, i.e., the delay
for performing a local step has a fixed known bound (note
that this does not apply to faulty processes—see below).
Clocks. Processes have access to local clocks with a
bounded and negligible rate drift to real time. These clocks
do not need to be synchronized.
Communication. Every pair of processes is connected by
two logical uni-directional links, e.g., pi and pj are con-
nected by links lij and lji. Links can abstract a physical
bus or a dedicated network link. We assume that links are
reliable and timely with high probability. This means that
in any transmission attempt, where a message is sent over
a link, there is a high probability that the message reaches
its destination and within a maximum delay d (known to the
processes) after being transmitted. We briefly discuss why
communication in our system is not synchronous and how it
differs from partial synchrony [13] in Appx. A. Moreover, we
also introduce a parameter X , which stands for the maximum
number of processes to which a process can send a message
in a communication step. This parameter can range between
0 and N − 1, and is used to avoid network congestions by
enforcing that processes selectively send their messages to an
arbitrary subset of the system.
B. Threat Model
Processes. We assume that some processes can exhibit arbi-
trary, a.k.a. Byzantine, behavior. Byzantine nodes can abstract
processes that have been compromised by attackers, or are
executing the algorithm incorrectly, e.g., as a result of some
fault (software or hardware). A Byzantine process can behave
arbitrarily, e.g., it may crash, fail to send or receive messages,
delay messages, send arbitrary messages, etc.
We assume that at most f = bN−13 c processes can be
Byzantine. This formula was proved to be an upper bound
for solving many forms of agreement in a variety of models
such as in non-synchronous models [12, 16].
In Sec. IV, we allow nodes to become passive in case they
fail to execute in a timely fashion. A process that exhibits
a Byzantine behavior or that enters the passive mode (see
Section IV-C) is termed faulty. Otherwise, the process is said
to be correct. Note that passive nodes are considered faulty
(at least) during the time they are passive, but are not counted
against the f Byzantine faults. Therefore, more than f nodes
could be faulty in a system over the full lifespan of a system
(up to f nodes could be Byzantine, and up to N processes
could be momentarily passive).
Clocks. The bounded and negligible rate drift assumption
in the system model has to hold only on a per protocol
execution basis, easily met by current technology (such as
techniques that rely on GPS [33] or trusted components [32]).
Hence the clock of a non-faulty process always behaves as
described in Section III-A.
Communication. Links are assumed to be faithful, reliable
and timely, with high probability. That is, (i) Byzantine
processes or network adversaries cannot modify the content
of messages sent on a link connecting correct processes
(implemented by authentication through unforgeable signa-
tures [4]). However, (ii) there is a small probability that
reliability and timeliness are violated. Precisely, we define
Pij(t) as the probability that a message transmitted on link
lij (with i 6= j) at time t gets lost or is delayed, such that
1 < Pij(t) < 2  1 are small strictly positive values. Such
violations exist in networks, as arguably all communication is
prone to unpredictable disturbances, e.g., bandwidth limitation,
bad channel quality, interference, collisions, and stack over-
flows [15]. We consider message losses as pure omissions2,
and we leave it up to the system/algorithm to define how to
deal with late messages (i.e., violating the d delay assumption),
that is, how to tolerate timing faults [2], according to their
anatomy in terms of negative impact on system properties [32].
IV. REAL-TIME BYZANTINE RELIABLE BROADCAST
Let us now present our solution to guarantee that correct
nodes reliably deliver broadcast messages in a timely fash-
ion, despite Byzantine nodes, and communication disruptions.
Sec. IV-A recalls the properties of the real-time Byzantine-
resilient reliable broadcast (RTBRB) primitive [21]. Then,
Sec. IV-B presents a high-level overview of the PISTIS event-
triggered algorithm, which implements the RTBRB primitive,
while Sec. IV-C provides a detailed presentation of PISTIS.
Finally, Sec. IV-D explains how passive nodes can recover and
become active again to ensure the liveness of the system.
A. Real-time Byzantine Reliable Broadcast Abstraction
Definition 1 (RTBRB). The real-time Byzantine reliable
broadcast (RTBRB) primitive guarantees the following proper-
ties [21], assuming every message is uniquely identified (e.g.,
using the pair of a sequence number and a process id—the
broadcaster’s id).3 In this abstraction, a process broadcasts
a message by invoking RTBRB-broadcast(). Similarly, a
process delivers a message by invoking RTBRB-deliver().
• RTBRB-Validity: If a correct process p broadcasts m,
then some correct process eventually delivers m.
• RTBRB-No duplication: No correct process delivers
message m more than once.
• RTBRB-Integrity: If some correct process delivers a
message m with sender pi and process pi is correct, then
m was previously broadcast by pi.
• RTBRB-Agreement: If some correct process delivers m,
then every correct process eventually delivers m.
• RTBRB-Timeliness: There exists a known ∆R such that if
a correct process broadcasts m at real-time t, no correct
process delivers m after real time t+ ∆R.
2We do not model correlated losses explicitly, as previous works like [21]
have shown that such bursts can be mitigated.
3RTBRB’s properties are equivalent to the ones of the Byzantine reliable
broadcast abstraction defined in [7, Module 3.12,p.117], excluding Timeliness.
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Figure 1. Example of a proof-of-connectivity run
It is important to note that the above abstraction does not
enforce ordering on the delivery of messages sent. We elabo-
rate more on that and how to achieve order in Sec. V. Note
also that in a system consisting of correct and faulty nodes,
these properties ensure that correct nodes deliver broadcast
messages within a bounded delay, while no such guarantee is
(and can be) provided about faulty nodes.
B. Overview of PISTIS
This section presents a high-level description of PISTIS, our
Byzantine event-triggered RTBRB algorithm. For simplicity,
we assume the total number of processes to be N = 3f + 1,
in which case a Byzantine quorum has a size of 2f + 1.
System Awareness. Given that broadcasts can be invoked
at unknown times, there might exist a correct process in
Π \ {pi} that is unaware of pi’s broadcast for an unbounded
amount of time after it was issued, since all links can lose
an unbounded number of messages. The occurrence of such
scenarios may hinder the system’s ability of delivering real-
time guarantees. To this end, we require that every process pj
constantly exchanges messages with the rest of the system.
This regular message exchange aims at capturing how well pj
is connected to other processes, and hence to what extent pj
is up-to-date with what is going on in the system (and to what
extent the system knows about pj’s state). We achieve this
constant periodic message exchange via a function, which we
call proof-of-connectivity.4 It requires each process to diffuse
heartbeats to the rest of the system in overlapping rounds: a
new round is started every d time units, and each round is
of a fixed duration T (where d < T). A round consists in
repeatedly (every d units of time) diffusing a signed heartbeat
message to X other processes. The set X of processes in
every repetition can change such that the union of processes
in all repetitions covers all processes in the system. Heartbeat
messages are uniquely identified by sequence numbers, which
are incremented prior to each round. On receipt of a heartbeat
message, a process appends its own signature to it as well as
all other seen signatures relative to that heartbeat; and sends
it to X other processes. At the end of each round, if a process
does not receive at least 2f + 1 signatures (including its own)
on its own heartbeat, it enters the passive mode.
Fig. 1 provides an example of a run of the proof-of-
connectivity protocol, depicted as a message sequence
4Periodic message exchange (heartbeats) has been used to discover the
network state in many monitoring algorithms [1, 17]
diagram, in a system composed of 4 processes. This figure
depicts part of the three first rounds of proof-of-connectivity
initiated by p0 (we only show the messages sent by p0 to
avoid cluttering the picture), namely PC 0 in blue, PC 1
in orange, and PC 2 in purple. In addition, in that case,
each proof of connectivity round is of length T = 6d.
Therefore, the blue PC 0 heartbeats are sent 6 times between
d0 and d5, the orange PC 1 heartbeats are sent 6 times
between d1 and d6, and the purple PC 2 heartbeats are sent
6 times between d2 and d7. If by the end of PC 0, p0 has
not received 2f replies to its heartbeats, it will become passive.
Diffusing Broadcasts. PISTIS relies on two types of
messages (Echo and Deliver messages) to ensure that
broadcast values are delivered in a timely fashion. Processes
exchange Echo messages either to start broadcasting new
values, or in response to received Echo messages. Echo
messages help processes gather a valid quorum (a Byzantine
write quorum [23] of size 2f + 1) of signatures on a single
value v relative to a broadcast instance. A broadcast instance
is identified by the id of the process broadcasting v and
a sequence number. Echo messages help prevent system
inconsistencies when malicious nodes send different values
with the same sequence number (same broadcast instance)
to different recipients. However, additional messages, namely
Deliver messages, are needed to help achieve delivery
within a bounded time after the broadcast.
When a process pi receives a value v through an Echo
message, it appends its signature to the message as well as
all other signatures it has received relative to v; and sends it
to X other processes. In addition, when pi receives a value
for the first time, it triggers a local timer of duration T.
Upon receiving a value signed by more than 2f processes,
a process delivers that value. However, a process that does
not receive more than 2f signatures on time (i.e., before the
timer expires) enters the passive mode. In case multiple values
are heard relative to a single process and sequence number
(equivocation), then the first heard value is the one to be
echoed. Note that processes continue executing the proof-
of-connectivity function during the echo and deliver phases
however by piggybacking heartbeats to echo/deliver messages.
As opposed to Echo messages that are diffused (i.e., re-
transmitted temporally and sporadically) for a duration T,
Deliver messages are diffused for 2T. This is needed to
ensure that if some correct processes start diffusing a message
between some time t and t + T, possibly at different times,
then there must be a T-long period of time where all of them
are diffusing the message (see Lemma 4 in Appx. B for more
details). Given a large enough collection of such processes
(f + 1 correct processes), this allows other processes to learn
about delivered values in a timely fashion.
Fig. 2 provides an example of a run of PISTIS, depicted as
a message sequence diagram. The system is composed of 4
processes. This figure depicts part of the echo (in blue) and
deliver (in orange) phases of one broadcast initiated by p0 (for
the purpose of this illustration, only the messages sent by p0
are shown). The purple “broadcast” and “deliver” tags indicate
the times at which p0 initiated its broadcast, and delivered
4
Figure 2. Example of a PISTIS run
Algorithm 1 proof-of-connectivity(T) @ process pi
1: seq = [0]n; // stores smallest valid sequence number per process.
2: sq = 0; // local sequence number.
3: RHB = [∅]n; // stores signatures on last d Td e heartbeats of processes.
4:
5: upon event initialization() ∨ check-connectivity() do
6: trigger Timeout(msg,T);
7: Execute h-diffuse(〈pi, sq〉, {σi});
8: RHB [pi].add(〈pi, sq〉; {σi}); sleep(d); sq++;
9: if sq − seq[pi] > dTd e then seq[pi]++;
10: end if
11: trigger check-connectivity();
12:
13: upon event Expired-Timer(〈pi, sq′〉, timeout) do
14: if |RHB [pi].getsig(sq′)| ≤ 2f then
15: // gets signatures on message with sequence number sq′
16: Initiate passive mode;
17: else RHB [pi].remove(sq′); // remove entry with seq. num. sq′
18: end if
19:
20: upon event receive HB (〈pj , sq′〉,Σ) do
21: if (sq′ ≥ seq[pj ]) then
22: RHB [pj ].setsig(sq′,RHB [pj ].getsig(sq′) ∪ Σ ∪ {σi});
23: if j 6= i ∧ sq′ 6= seq[pj ] then
24: Execute h-diffuse(〈pj , sq′〉,RHB [pj ].getsig(sq′));
25: end if
26: end if
27: if (sq′ − seq[pj ]) > dTd e ∧ j 6= i then
28: seq[pj ] = sq′ − d Td e;
29: RHB [pj ].remove(sq′′), ∀sq′′ < seq[pj ];
30: end if
31:
32: Function h-diffuse(msg,Σ)
33: for (int i = 0; i ≤ d T
d
e; i++) do
34: send HB (msg,Σ) to X other processes;
35: sleep(d);
36: end for
37:
it. In this example, the echo phase is initially meant to last
for a duration of T = 6d. However, it happens here that p0
received 2f echo messages for its broadcast by 3d+k, where
0 < k < d, which is why d3 is shorter than the other intervals.
Therefore, p0 stops its echo phase and starts its deliver phase
at 3d+k. As mentioned above, the deliver phase lasts for 2T.
If p0 has not received 2f deliver messages in return by the
end of that deliver phase, then it becomes passive.
C. Detailed Presentation of PISTIS
We now discuss PISTIS (Algorithm 2) in more details.5
PISTIS’s proof of correctness can be found in Appx. B.
Process states. Processes can become passive under certain
scenarios by calling “Initiate passive mode”. Processes that
were behaving correctly thus far, are considered faulty when
5Note that all functions presented in Algorithms 1 and 2 are non-blocking.
Algorithm 2 PISTIS @ process pi
1: Execute proof-of-connectivity(T);
2:
3: upon event RTBRB-broadcast(pi, sq, v) do
4: Execute proof-of-connectivity in piggyback mode;
5: Initialize Recho(pi, sq, v) = {σi};
6: Execute t-diffuse(〈pi, sq, v〉,T,echo);
7:
8: upon event receive Echo (〈pj , sq, v〉,Σ) do
9: if @Recho(pj , sq, ...) then
10: Initialize Recho(pj , sq, v) = {σi} ∪ Σ;
11: Execute proof-of-connectivity in piggyback mode;
12: if Recho(pj , sq, v) ≤ 2f then
13: Execute t-diffuse(〈pj , sq, v〉,T,echo);
14: else Execute deliver-msg(pj , sq, v,Recho(pj , sq, v));
15: end if
16: else if ∃Recho(pj , sq, v) then
17: Recho(pj , sq, v) = Recho(pj , sq, v) ∪ Σ;
18: if Recho(pj , sq, v) > 2f (for the first time) then
19: Execute deliver-msg(pj , sq, v,Recho(pj , sq, v));
20: end if
21: else if ∃Recho(pj , sq, v′ 6= v) then
22: // pj has lied about message with sq
23: if Σ > 2f then
24: garbage-collect Recho(pj , sq, v′);
25: Recho(pj , sq, v) = Σ;
26: Execute deliver-msg(pj , sq, v,Σ);
27: end if
28: end if
29:
30: upon event receive Deliver (〈pj , sq, v,Σ〉,Σ′) do
31: if @Rdeliver (pj , sq, v) then
32: Recho(pj , sq, v) = Recho(pj , sq, v) ∪ Σ;
33: Execute deliver-msg(pj , sq, v,Σ);
34: end if
35: Rdeliver (pj , sq, v) = Rdeliver (pj , sq, v) ∪ Σ′;
36:
37: upon event Expired-Timer(msg, timeout ,mode) do
38: if ∃Rmode(msg) ∧ |Rmode(msg)| ≤ 2f then
39: switch mode do
40: case echo
41: if no lie is discovered on msg then
42: Initiate passive mode;
43: end if
44: case deliver
45: Initiate passive mode;
46: end if
47:
48: Function t-diffuse(msg, timeout ,mode)
49: trigger Timeout(msg, timeout ,mode);
50: for (int i = 0; i ≤ d timeout
d
e; i++) do
51: Σ = Rmode(msg);
52: switch mode do
53: case echo
54: send Echo (msg,Σ) to X random processes;
55: case deliver
56: send Deliver (msg,Σ) to X random processes;
57: sleep(d);
58: end for
59:
60: Function deliver-msgpi (pj , sq, v,Σ)
61: if @Rdeliver (pj , sq, v) then
62: Execute proof-of-connectivity in piggyback mode;
63: trigger RTBRB-deliver(pj , sq, v);
64: Initialize Rdeliver (pj , sq, v) = {σi};
65: Stop sending any Echo ()
66: end if
67: Execute t-diffuse(〈pj , sq, v,Σ〉, 2T,deliver);
68:
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they initiate a passive mode and can notify the application
above of this fact. Later in this section, we show how
processes in the passive mode can come back to normal
operation by calling “Initiate active mode”.
Ensuring sufficient connectivity. In PISTIS every process
executes the proof-of-connectivity Algorithm 1. Namely, a
process pi forms a heartbeat HB (〈pi, sq〉, {σi}), where sq
is pi’s current heartbeat sequence number and σi is pi’s
signature on 〈pi, sq〉. Process pi also stores (in array RHB )
for every process (including itself) all signatures it receives
on heartbeats with a valid sequence number. A valid heartbeat
sequence number for some process pj is a sequence number
∈ [seq[pj ], seq[pj ] + dTd e] where seq[pj ] + dTd e is the largest
heartbeat sequence number known for pj . Heartbeats with
invalid sequence numbers are simply ignored. After forming
its heartbeat, pi sets a timeout of duration T, and sends this
heartbeat to X > f random processes dTd e times (lines 32–
36). Process pi increments its heartbeat sequence number and
repeats this whole procedure every d < T. Upon increment-
ing its heartbeat sequence number, pi updates its own valid
heartbeat sequence numbers (lines 9–10).
A process pi receiving HB (〈pj , sq′〉,Σ) ignores this heart-
beat if sq′ is smaller than the smallest valid heartbeat sequence
number known for pj . Otherwise, pi updates pj’s valid heart-
beat sequence numbers (lines 27–30) and the list of all seen
signatures on these valid heartbeats (line 22). Then, pi diffuses
the heartbeat with the updated list of seen signatures to X
random processes (line 24).
When a timer expires, pi checks RHB [pi] for the number
of accumulated signatures on its corresponding heartbeat. If
that number is ≤ 2f , pi enters the passive mode; otherwise it
removes the corresponding entry from RHB [pi] (lines 13–19).
Broadcasting a message. A process pi that wishes to
broadcast a value v, calls RTBRB-broadcast(pi, sq , v)
from Algorithm 2 (lines 3–7), where sq is a sequence
number that uniquely identifies this broadcast instance. Given
such an event, pi produces a signature σi for the payload
〈pi, sq , v〉. It then triggers a timeout of duration T and sends
an Echo (〈pi, sq , v〉, {σi}) message dTd e times to X other
random processes. Proof-of-connectivity information from
pi is now piggybacked on these messages, as on all other
Echo () and Deliver () messages.
Sending and Receiving Echoes. When pi receives
an Echo (〈pj , sq , v〉,Σ), pi reacts differently depending on
whether it is not already echoing for this instance (lines 8–15),
already echoing v (lines 16–20), or already echoing a different
value (lines 21–27). In all three cases, pi starts delivering
a message (and stops sending echoes) as soon as at least
2f+1 distinct signatures have been collected for that message.
Sending and Receiving Deliver Messages. When
pi receives Deliver (〈pj , sq , v,Σ〉,Σ′) for the first
time (lines 60–67), it delivers 〈pj , sq , v,Σ〉, and
sends Deliver (〈pj , sq , v,Σ〉,Rdeliver (pj , sq , v)) using
t-diffuse(). In case that deliver message is not the first
one received (lines 30–35), pi aggregates all seen signatures
for 〈pj , sq , v〉 in Rdeliver (pj , sq , v) (all functions that use
Rdeliver (pj , sq , v) now use the new updated value).
Process Passive Mode. When a timeout set by process pi
with parameters (msg , timeout ,mode) expires, pi enters the
passive mode if the set Rmode has less than 2f + 1 distinct
signatures, for mode = deliver. For mode = echo, pi
enters passive mode if in addition to Rmode not having 2f+1
signatures, pi did not discover a lie for that broadcast instance.
Remark 1. Any message of the form Echo (〈pj , sq , v〉,Σ1)
or Deliver (〈pj , sq , v,Σ2〉,Σ3) is termed invalid if: (1) Σ1
contains an incorrect signature (and similarly for Σ2 and Σ3);
or (2) Σ1 does not contain a signature from pj (and similarly
for Σ2); or (3) Σ2 has less than 2f + 1 signatures. Invalid
messages are simply discarded.
Remark 2. We assume that processes sign payloads of
the form (pi, sq , v,E) for echo messages and of the form
(pi, sq , v,D) for deliver messages. We use the E and D tags to
distinguish echo and deliver payloads, thereby ensuring that
an attacker cannot use echo signatures as deliver signatures.
Note that echo signatures are sent as part of deliver messages
as a proof that a quorum of processes echoed a certain value.
As mentioned at the beginning of this section, PISTIS is
correct is the sense that it satisfies all five properties of the
RTBRB primitive presented in Sec. IV-A:
Theorem 1 (Correctness of PISTIS). Under the model pre-
sented in Sec. III, the PISTIS algorithm presented in Fig. 2
implements the RTBRB primitive.
A proof of this theorem can be found in Appx. B. Let us
point out here that the ∆R bound of the RTBRB-Timeliness
property turns out to be 3T.
D. Byzantine-Resilient Recovery
If process pi detects that it is executing under bad network
conditions, it enters the passive mode and signals the upper
application. As a result, pi stops broadcasting and delivering
broadcast messages (by not executing line 3 and line 63)
to avoid violating RTBRB-Timelines. However, pi continues
participating in the dissemination of the broadcast and proof-
of-connectivity messages to avoid having too many nodes not
collecting enough messages and hence becoming passive.
Once the network conditions are acceptable again, pi can
recover and resume delivering broadcast messages. More
precisely, a process pi that enters passive mode at time t
can operate normally again if the interval [t, t + ∆R] is free
of any passive mode initiations. This ∆R duration ensures
that the messages delivered by a recovered process pi do
not violate any RTBRB properties. After a delay ∆R, nodes
will resume their full participation in the protocol, and either
deliver messages or stay on hold.
Note that in case of multiple broadcast instances, passive
nodes that become active again should learn the latest sequence
number of broadcasts for other nodes. Otherwise Byzantine
nodes can exploit this to hinder the liveness of the system.
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Remark 3. Given that processes can now shift between
passive and active modes, we specify our notion of correct
processes as follows. A system run is modeled by a trace of
events happening during that run. An event has a timestamp
and a node associated with it. Moreover, an event can either
be a correct event or a Byzantine event. Given an algorithm A,
a process p is deemed correct w.r.t. A and a trace τ , if: (1) it
follows its specification from e1, the first correct A-related
event happening in τ , to e2, the last correct A-related event
happening in τ ; (2) p’s events between e1 and e2 must all
be correct; (3) p must also have followed its specification
since it last started; and (4) p must never have lost its keys
(so that no other node can impersonate p when p follows
its specification). The results presented below also hold for
this definition of correctness, because correct processes are
required to be active through the entire broadcast instance.
This recovery mechanism improves the overall resilience of
the system. Indeed, having all processes in passive mode can
occur if 2f + 1 nodes are passive, which is now harder to
achieve if nodes can recover sufficiently fast enough.
V. BEYOND A RELIABLE BROADCAST
Unlike liveness in asynchronous reliable broadcast, the
RTBRB-Timeliness property (a safety property) introduces a
scent of physical ordering. This ordering is due to the fact
that timeliness stipulates, for each execution, a termination
event to occur “at or before” some ∆R on the time-line. This
said, the reader may wonder to what extent does the real-time
Byzantine-resilient reliable broadcast (of Sec. IV-A) help in
establishing total order?
The answer to this question lies in examining what happens
to multiple broadcasts issued by the same or by different
nodes. When multiple broadcasts interleave, e.g., when they
are issued within a period shorter than ∆R (the upper time
bound on delivering a message), messages might be deliv-
ered to different processes in different orders. The timeliness
property of the real-time Byzantine-resilient reliable broadcast
only ensures that a message m that is broadcast at time t is
delivered at any time in [t, t+∆R]. Thus, to ensure total order
on all system events, e.g., for implementing State Machine
Replication, additional abstractions need to be built on top of
the real-time Byzantine-resilient reliable broadcast primitive
that we have developed so far.
In this section, we investigate how to modularly obtain
such an order on system events while still preserving real-
time and Byzantine-resilience. We define two build blocks
that build on top of RTBRB, namely the RTBC real-time
Byzantine consensus abstraction (Def. 2)—a fundamental
building block for state machine replication, atomic broadcast
and leader election [9, 7]; and the RTBAB real-time atomic
broadcast abstraction (Def. 4)—to establish total order on
system events. We then provide characterizations of classes of
algorithms that implement these abstractions: Thm. 2 provides
a characterization of the PISTIS-CS class of algorithms that
implement RTBC, while Thm. 3 provides a characterization
of the PISTIS-AT class of algorithms that implement RTBAB.
Finally, we provided examples of algorithms that belong to
these classes (see Examples 1 and 2).
We start with the following assumption that constrains the
ways processes can communicate.
Assumption 1. Correct processes access the network only
via the RTBRB primitive, namely using the two operations:
RTBRB-broadcast() and RTBRB-deliver().
From Assumption 1, a correct process pi that receives a
message from an operation other than RTBRB-deliver()
simply ignores that message by dropping it.
A. Real-Time Byzantine Consensus
Roughly speaking, solving the Byzantine consensus problem
consists in having distributed processes agree on a given
value, even though some of the processes may fail arbitrarily.
Byzantine consensus was first identified by Pease et al. [28],
and formalized as the interactive consistency problem. An
algorithm achieves interactive consistency if it allows the
non-faulty processes to come to a consistent view of the
initial values of all the processes, including the faulty ones.
Once interactive consistency has been reached, the non-faulty
processes can reach consensus by applying a deterministic
averaging or filtering function on the values of their view.
We apply the following assumption to reach consensus.
Assumption 2. Once interactive consistency terminates, every
correct process scans the obtained vector and decides on the
value that appears at least 2f + 1 times. If no such value
exists, then the process decides ⊥, a distinguished element
that indicates that no value has been decided.
Definition 2 (RTBC). The real-time Byzantine consensus
(RTBC) abstraction is expressed by the following properties:6
• RTBC-Validity: If all correct processes propose the same
value v, then any correct process that decides, decides v.
Otherwise, a correct process may only decide a value that
was proposed by some correct process or ⊥.
• RTBC-Agreement: No two correct processes decide dif-
ferently.
• RTBC-Termination: Correct processes eventually decide.
• RTBC-Timeliness: If a correct process pi proposes a
value to consensus at time t, then no correct process
decides after t+ ∆C.
In RTBC a process pi can propose a value v to consensus
by invoking RTBC-propose(pi, inst , v), where inst is a
sequence number that uniquely identifies a RTBC instance.
Similarly, a process pi decides on a value v by invoking
RTBC-decide(pi, inst , v). In addition RTBC-init(inst)
instantiate a new instance of RTBC with id inst , i.e., for
sequence number inst .
Definition 3. An algorithm is said to be bounded if it only
uses a known bounded number of communication rounds.
6The properties of RTBC are the same as the ones of the traditional (strong)
Byzantine consensus defined in [13] (see also [7, Module 5.11,p.246]),
excluding the Timeliness property.
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Theorem 2 (Characterization of the PISTIS-CS class). Let
PISTIS-CS be the class of bounded (Def. 3) algorithms that
implements interactive consistency under Assumptions 1 and 2.
Then, PISTIS-CS algorithms also implement RTBC in our
model (described in Sec. III).
See Appx. C for a proof of this result.
Example 1 (Examples of PISTIS-CS algorithms). Because the
interactive consistency problem has been solved using different
algorithms that satisfy Def. 3, our result applies to various
existing algorithms, such as [28, 11, 14, 22].
B. Real-Time Byzantine-Resilient Atomic Broadcast
Definition 4 (RTBAB). A real-time Byzantine-resilient atomic
broadcast (RTBAB) has the same properties as RTBRB (with
a different timeliness bound) plus an additional ordering
property (therefore, we only present the properties that differ
from RTBRB’s):
• RTBAB-Timeliness: There exists a known ∆A such that
if a correct process broadcasts m at time t, no correct
process delivers m after real time t+ ∆A.
• RTBAB-Total order: Let m1 and m2 be any two mes-
sages and suppose that pi and pj are any two correct
processes that deliver m1 and m2. If pi delivers m1
before m2, then pj delivers m1 before m2.
We now define the class of algorithms (called
RoundBased ), through the properties listed below, that
modularly implement RTBAB properties. RoundBased
algorithms make use of a single RTBRB instance and multiple
instances of RTBC. We first constrain a RoundBased
algorithm to start an RTBRB instance within a bounded
amount of time for any broadcast call.
Property 1. If a correct process pi RTBAB-broadcasts a
message m at time t, then it also RTBRB-broadcasts m by
time t+ ∆B , for some bounded ∆B .
We then require a RoundBased algorithm to start (or end
in case this has already been done before) an RTBC instance,
within a bounded amount of time, every time the RTBRB
instance delivers.
Property 2. If a correct process RTBRB-delivers a message
m at time t, such that m’s broadcaster is also correct, then
it either RTBC-proposes or RTBC-decides m by t + ∆P , for
some bounded ∆P .
In addition, the next property constrains the values that can
be proposed at each RTBC instance, namely that at most one
non-⊥ value can be proposed at each instance.
Property 3. Given an RTBC instance inst , there exists a value
v, such that each correct process either RTBC-propose v or
⊥ at inst .
Next, we require a RoundBased algorithm to deliver a
RTBC-decided value within a bounded amount of time (Prop-
erty 4) and to ensure that non-RTBC-decided values are re-
proposed in later RTBC rounds (Property 5).
Property 4. If a correct process RTBC-decides a message m
at time t, then it also RTBAB-delivers m by time t+ ∆D, for
some bounded ∆D.
Property 5. A correct process pi that proposes a value v at a
given time t, using a given RTBC instance inst , and such that
this instance does not decide v, also RTBC-propose v at some
instance inst + k, where 0 < k. Moreover, pi RTBC-proposes
v at the smallest instance between inst +1 and inst +k where
m is proposed by some process.
Finally, we require that nodes participate in all successive
RTBC instances in a monotonic fashion.
Property 6. Correct processes RTBC-propose exactly one
value per RTBC instance; propose values in all RTBC in-
stances (i.e., for all instances inst ∈ N); in increasing
order w.r.t. the instance numbers of the RTBC instances (i.e.,
if pi proposes values at times t1 and t2 using the RTBC
instances inst1 and inst2, respectively, and t1 < t2, then
inst1 < inst2); and not in parallel (i.e., if pi proposes a
value at time t using an RTBC instance inst , and that this
RTBC instance has not decided by time t′ > t, then pi does
not propose any other value between t and t′).
Definition 5. Let RoundBased be the class of round-based
algorithms that satisfy the properties 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6.
Theorem 3 (Characterization of the PISTIS-AT class). Let
PISTIS-AT be the class of RoundBased algorithms that im-
plement the traditional Byzantine total-order broadcast under
Assumption 1. Then, PISTIS-AT algorithms also implement
RTBAB in our system (described in Sec. III).
To prove Theorem 3, it is sufficient to prove that a RTBAB-
broadcasted value m is always RTBAB-delivered within a
bounded amount of time. Because A is round-based, m must
be RTBRB-proposed and RTBRB-decided within a bounded
amount of time. Consequently there is (within a bounded
amount of time) an RTBC instance where “enough” correct
nodes RTBC-propose m, so that m gets RTBC-decided upon
and RTBAB-delivered within a bounded amount of time. The
proof of Theorem 3 is detailed in Appx. D.
Example 2 (Example of a PISTIS-AT algorithm). Finally,
algorithm 3 provides an example of a PISTIS-AT algorithm
that implements RTBAB modularly, which we adapted from [7,
Alg.6.2,p.290] to guarantee timeliness.
VI. EVALUATION
In this section, we evaluate PISTIS’s reliability, latency, and
incurred overhead on network bandwidth.
A. Optimizations
We implemented three optimizations to improve the per-
formance of PISTIS (as described in Section IV-C). (1) If a
process pi knows that some process pj has already received
2f + 1 echo signatures for some message m, pi stops sending
echoes related to m to pj . Every process implements this
optimization by maintaining a list, say L, that contains all the
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Algorithm 3 Example of a PISTIS-AT algorithm @process pi
1: upon event RTBAB-init(rtbab) do
2: unordered = []n; next = [0]n; seq = 0;
3: delivered = ∅; busy = False; inst = 0;
4:
5: upon event RTBAB-broadcast(pi,m) do
6: trigger RTBRB-broadcast(pi, seq,m);
7: seq++;
8:
9: upon event RTBRB-deliver(pj ,num,m) do
10: if num = next[pj ] then
11: next [pj ] = next [pj ] + 1;
12: if m /∈ delivered then
13: unordered [pj ] = unordered [pj ].append(〈pj ,m〉);
14: end if
15: else {wait(∆W); triggerRTBRB-deliver(pj ,num,m); }
16: end if
17:
18: upon event ∃pj : unordered [pj ] 6= [] ∧ busy = False do
19: busy = True;
20: trigger RTBC-init(inst);
21: // initiate a new real-time Byzantine consensus instance
22: if unordered [leader(inst)] 6= [] then
23: m = unordered [leader(inst)].head();
24: else {m = ⊥;}
25: end if
26: trigger RTBC-propose(pi, inst ,m);
27:
28: upon event RTBC-decide(pi, inst ′, decided) do
29: if inst ′ = inst then
30: if decided /∈ delivered ∧ decided 6= ⊥ then
31: delivered = delivered ∪ {decided};
32: trigger RTBAB-deliver(leader(inst), decided);
33: end if
34: unordered [leader(inst)].remove(decided);
35: inst++; busy = False;
36: else {wait(∆W); trigger RTBC-decide(pi, inst ′, decided); }
37: end if
38:
39: Function leader(instance) {return(instance mod n); }
40:
processes from which it has heard 2f+1 signatures for a given
message. During a broadcast, a process diffuses a message to
X processes at random among Π \ L. Processes do the same
for deliver messages. (2) Processes do not verify signatures
that they have already received. (3) Processes skip messages
that only contain signatures that were already received.
B. Methodology and Parameter Settings
We implemented PISTIS in C++ on the Omnet++ 5.4.1 net-
work simulator [25]. In order to accurately measure PISTIS’s
communication overhead, we configure network links to have a
non-limiting 1Gbps throughput, and a communication latency
of either 1ms or 5ms. We evaluated PISTIS’s performance
using two signature schemes of similar security guarantees,
and available in the OpenSSL library [26]: RSA-2048 (i.e.,
256 bytes long signatures) and elliptic curves (EC) with
prime256v1 curves (i.e., 71 bytes long signatures). We use
broadcast messages of sizes equal to 1 byte and 1Kbits.
We consider the probability of losing/omitting a message
sent at any point in time to be p ∈ {0.i | 0 ≤ i ≤ 9}. We run
our simulations for systems with N ∈ {25, 49, 73} processes,
and for several values of X , which is the number of processes
each process forwards a message m to during diffusion. For
each value of N , we consider various probability values with
which a sent message can be lost/omitted.
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Figure 3. Probability of a correct process entering passive mode when T = 6d
or T = 8d
C. PISTIS’s Reliability
To assess PISTIS’s reliability, we evaluate the probability
that a correct process enters the passive mode. Such a predicate
is crucial, as it may render PISTIS unresponsive. For example,
when N = 3f+1, a single correct process staying passive for
long-enough can, in the worst case (when f Byzantine pro-
cesses are not sending messages), leave 2f correct processes,
which would not be enough to gather quorums of size 2f +1,
leading those 2f processes to become passive.
For a given value of N and p, we invoke a broadcast at
one of the processes and record any non-Byzantine process
that crashed itself during broadcast. We obtain our results
by repeating each experiment 105 times, and we report the
probability that a process crashes itself as:
(num. of experiments with self-crashed processes)/105
We study the impact of several parameters, including T,
N , X , f , and p, on PISTIS’s reliability, and determine which
values should be used to enforce an intended system reliability.
Figure 3 shows that the system’s reliability increases with its
size and T’s value. For example, when T = 8d, a system with
25 (resp. 49) processes operates with high reliability (i.e., there
is a negligible probability that a process becomes passive)
under message loss rates reaching up to 30% (resp. 40%).
Figure 4 shows that the actual number of Byzantine
processes, which varies between 0 and f (the maximum
number of tolerable Byzantine nodes), influences the system’s
resiliency. As one could expect, with fewer processes being
Byzantine, higher message loss rates are tolerated without
any process shutdown.
Impact of the diffusion fanout. In the results presented
so far, processes forward each message to X = f + 1
other random processes. We now study the effect of X by
measuring PISTIS’s reliability when it varies. Figure 5 shows
that increasing X helps increase the overall system reliability.
As expected increasing the fanout (value of X) reduces the
probability of having a non-Byzantine node becoming passive.
Recovery. Figure 6 details the probability that no Byzantine
quorum remains active after a broadcast instance when the
message loss probability increases. First, one can observe
that the recovery mechanisms improve the resiliency of the
system. For example, with N = 49, PISTIS can tolerate a
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Figure 4. Probability of a correct process entering passive mode in a system
of 49 processes (i.e., f = 16) using T = 8d and X = 17, when 0, 4, 8, 12
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70% message loss rate without system-wide crashes thanks to
the recovery mechanisms, improving over the value of 50%
obtained without recovery. Second, we show that one can
further improve the system’s tolerance to message losses by
overprovisioning the system. By using three more nodes, i.e.,
52 in total, the system can tolerate f = 16 Byzantine nodes
and now tolerate up to 80% of message losses.
D. PISTIS latency and bandwidth consumption
Next, we evaluate PISTIS’s overhead, precisely quantifying
the corresponding incurred bandwidth and latency. For
these experiments, we average results over 100 runs. We
consider two possible network delays between pairs of nodes,
respectively 1ms and 5ms, and two broadcast message sizes,
1 byte and 1 Kbits. We use T = 8d, since our reliability
results show it allows a very large number of message losses
to be tolerated. However, we now run our experiments without
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Figure 7. Average latency with a 1ms link latency with T = 8d and without
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Figure 8. Average latency with a 5ms link latency
any message losses to measure the worst case bandwidth
consumption. We measure both the protocol latency and
bandwidth consumption depending on the value of X that the
processes use.
Latency. Figures 7 and 8 detail the latency for a broadcast
message to be delivered by all correct processes in systems of
size 25, 49, and 73, using either RSA or EC: PISTIS delivers
latencies within [3ms, 45ms] depending on the network delay
d. The latency increases when N increases, and decreases
when X increases. Note that due to their signature and
verification costs, EC is better suited for small systems (≤ 49
nodes), while RSA is better suited for larger systems.
PISTIS’s latency vs. related systems’ latency. More-
over, we provide readers with a latency comparison between
PISTIS and related works on real-time Byzantine broadcasts
demonstrating that PISTIS has a superior performance. The
comparison is done based on the worst case delay (a direct
experimental evaluation would not be fair, since not all pre-
vious work [8] consider probabilistic synchronous networks).
Let us first refine the definition of d introduced in Sec. III-A.
Let dn be the maximum network delay, and dp be the
maximum local processing time, which includes the crypto-
graphic operations overhead, such that d can be decomposed
as dp + dn. Christian et al. [8] compute the worst case delay
as 10∗ (f +2)∗ (n−1)∗dn where f is the maximum number
of faulty processes, n the total number of processes, and dn
the network delay. In this work, dp is equal to 10. Kozhaya
et. al [21] compute the worst-case delay as 3 ∗ R ∗ d, where
R is the number of consecutive synchronous communication
rounds the same message gets disseminated (time-triggered re-
transmissions). PISTIS’s worst case delay is proved to be 3∗T.
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Figure 9. Average bandwidth consumption per node and per communication
link with a 1ms link latency without message losses
To ensure fairness and consistency with latency experiments
earlier in this section, we set R = 8 and T = 8d. However,
due to PISTIS’s signature management (see, for example, the
optimizations described in Sec. VI-A), PISTIS’s worst case
delay can be alternatively computed as (3∗8∗dn)+(2∗N∗dp).
This is in part due to the fact that in PISTIS nodes avoid re-
verifying signatures that they have already verified.
Table I shows the worst case latencies of all algorithms
for dn = 1ms (note that, as mentioned above, in the first
column dp = 10, while in the last two columns dp is such
that 1 < dp < 10, and can be derived from the numbers
provided in the table).
[8] [21] PISTIS
N = 25, f = 8 2400 ms 26 ms 25.6 ms
N = 50, f = 16 8640 ms 70 ms 27 ms
N = 100, f = 33 34650 ms 150 ms 30 ms
Table I
WORST CASE LATENCIES
Let us make two main observations. First, compared to the
other protocols, PISTIS has superior performance, which is
attributed to the fact that PISTIS is event triggered, utilizes
fast signature schemes and implements some optimizations to
reduce the number of signatures created and verified, induces
less network congestion (which increase individual message
failures) and allows processes suffering timing failures for
fast detection of their tardiness. Second, PISTIS’s expected
performance in practice (see Figure 7) is significantly better
than the worst case delay bound reported in the table.
Network bandwidth consumption. We now measure PIS-
TIS’s bandwidth overhead per broadcast invocation, using
RSA and EC signatures. Figures 9 and 10 present the band-
width consumption for 1 byte payloads with 1ms and 5ms link
delay, respectively. One can observe that using the gossip-like
approach with X = f + 1, the bandwidth is 8 (resp. 5) times
lower than when using RSA (resp. EC) as opposed to using
all-to-all communication, i.e., X = N . We also showcase in
Figure 11 that the bandwidth consumption very reasonably
increase when the message payload is increased to 1Kbits.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we studied how to build large-scale distributed
protocols that tolerate network faults and attacks while pro-
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Figure 10. Average bandwidth consumption per node and per communication
link with a 5ms link latency without message losses
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Figure 11. Average bandwidth consumption per node and per communication
link with a 1ms link latency using either 1 B or 1 KB messages, without
message losses
viding real-time communication. We introduced a suite of
proven correct algorithms, starting from a baseline real-time
Byzantine reliable broadcast algorithm, called PISTIS, all the
way up to real-time Byzantine atomic broadcast and consensus
algorithms. PISTIS is empirically shown to be robust, scalable,
and capable of meeting timing deadlines of real CPS applica-
tions. PISTIS withstands message loss (and delay) rates up to
40% in systems with 49 nodes and provides bounded delivery
latencies in the order of a few milliseconds. PISTIS improves
over the state-of-the-art in scalability and latency through its
event-triggered nature, gossip-based communications, and fast
signature verifications. Our work simplifies the construction of
powerful distributed and decentralized monitoring and control
applications of various CPS domains, including state-machine
replication for fault and intrusion tolerance.
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APPENDIX A
DIFFERENCES BETWEEN PROBABILISTIC SYNCHRONY
AND OTHER STANDARD MODELS
a) Comparison with fully asynchronous models: Our
model is more informative than traditional fully asynchronous
models. More precisely, asynchronous models do not make any
assumptions regarding message transmission and processing
delays, while we assume that messages are delivered within a
maximum transmission delay d with high probability.
b) Comparison with synchronous models: Our commu-
nication model is a probabilistic synchronous one. We recall
that in every transmission attempt a link may (with some
probability) violate reliability and timeliness by dropping the
message or delivering it within a delay > d. In case of
message loss (omission) a sender that needs to re-transmit
that message again faces yet another risk of transmission
failure. Due to omissions (losses in consecutive transmission
attempts) and the required follow-up re-transmissions, the time
it takes to send a message reliably from one process to another
(measured from the time of the first transmission attempt)
may be unbounded. So, despite links being reliable and timely
with high probability, our communication system is no longer
synchronous.
c) Comparison with partially synchronous models: In
comparison with partial synchrony [2], which assumes that
communication becomes forever synchronous after some un-
known point in time, our probabilistic synchronous model
guarantees only finite synchronous periods (with variable
durations) that may occur randomly during the lifetime of the
system. In fact such probabilistic synchronous communication
has been shown to be weaker, in some sense [3], than
partial synchrony. For example, while the celebrated failure
detectors of [1] can be implemented in partially synchronous
systems they are impossible to implement in the systems with
probabilistic synchronous communication [3].
d) The need for probabilistic synchrony models: Proba-
bilistic synchronous models (such as the one presented here
or [5, 3]) are more “realistic” than synchronous models in the
sense that timing assumptions cannot always be ensured in
distributed systems because, for example, of the difficulty of
guaranteeing reliable communication between the nodes of a
system. Making the probability of timing failures (e.g., that
messages might be delivered after d) transparent to the model
and protocols makes them more robust. For example, it allows
designing protocols where messages might not always arrive
within a specified maximum transmission delay. Systems that
require processes to operate in a timely fashion, such as
mission critical systems, can therefore dynamically adapt to
such untimely situations to ensure that timing guarantees are
fulfilled.
e) Comparison with quasi-synchronous models: Quasi-
synchronous models [5] address the timing issues mentioned
above. In [5] synchronism is characterized by the following
properties: P1—processing speeds are bounded and known;
P2—message delivery delays are bounded and known; P3—
local clock rate drifts are bounded and known; P4—load
patterns are bounded and known; and P5—differences among
local clocks are bounded and known. A system is quasi-
synchronous if it satisfies properties P1–P5, and at least one
of those does not hold with some known non-zero probability.
As in a quasi-synchronous model, in our probabilistic model
P2 only holds with high probability. Note, however, that in our
probabilistic model we do not assume that differences among
local clocks are bounded and known.
APPENDIX B
CORRECTNESS OF PISTIS (ALGORITHM 2)
Lemma 1 (Validity). If a correct process pi broadcasts m
then pi eventually delivers m.
Proof outline. Because pi is correct, it will hear echoes of m
from 2f + 1 processes (including pi) by t + T, where t is
the time pi broadcasted m. This is true as otherwise, i.e., if
less than 2f + 1 echoes for m are heard, pi would kill itself
(hence is no longer correct). Indeed, pi triggered a timer (see
line 49 of Algorithm 2) when it started broadcasting m (see
line 6). Because pi received 2f+1 echoes for m, it must have
delivered m too (see lines 14, 19, and 26 of Algorithm 2).
Lemma 2 (No duplication). No correct process delivers
message m more than once.
Proof outline. According to line 60 of Algorithm 2 a process
only delivers a message if the corresponding Rdeliver does not
exist, and creates one right after delivering, thereby preventing
from delivering a message twice.
Lemma 3 (Integrity). If some correct process pj delivers a
message m with correct sender pi, then m was previously
broadcasted by pi.
Proof outline. Because pj delivered m, it must have received
2f + 1 signed echoes for m (see lines 14, 19, 26, and 33 of
Algorithm 2). As mentioned in Remark 1, an echo message
is not handled unless it is signed by the claimed sender.
More precisely, upon receipt of a message of the form
Echo (〈pi, sq , v〉,Σ) or Deliver (〈pi, sq , v,Σ〉,Σ′), pj only
handle the message if Σ contains a signature from pi. Now,
because the sender pi is correct, it must have indeed sent an
echo message for 〈pi, v〉. Finally, we prove by induction on the
chain of local events happening at pi (a correct process) that
led to this message being sent, that pi must have broadcasted
it.
Lemma 4 (Intersecting delivery). Let p be a correct process
that starts delivering some message m at some time td. Then,
there exists a collection B of 2f + 1 processes such that all
correct processes in B only deliver m for a full T duration
starting some time prior to td + T.
Proof outline. Let us first point out that because p starts
delivering at td, and because it is correct, 2f + 1 processes
must have received this deliver message by td+T (otherwise p
would kill itself because it wouldn’t be connected—the proof-
of-connectivity is executed in piggyback mode). Let A be this
collection of 2f + 1 processes (note that p ∈ A). For each
correct process q ∈ A, q must have started delivering some
time prior to td + T.
Let us now prove this lemma by induction on td.
Either a correct process within A started delivering prior to
td or not. If one did, in which case td > 0, then we conclude by
our induction hypothesis. Otherwise all correct nodes in A (at
least f + 1) are only delivering starting from td. Because they
start delivering prior to td + T, and because they deliver for
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2T, it must be that all correct processes within that collection
only deliver m for a full T duration starting at most by td+T
(until at most td + 2T).
Lemma 5 (Timely agreement). If a correct process pi broad-
casts m at real time t, then all correct processes deliver m
by t+ 3T.
Proof outline. Since pi is correct during this broadcast, then
it must have received 2f + 1 echoes for m and must then
have started delivering m at td ∈ [t, t + T]. By Lemma 4,
there exists a collection B of 2f + 1 processes such that all
correct processes in B only deliver m for a full T duration
starting some time prior to td + T. Now, every other correct
process pj must be connected to 2f+1 processes in any proof-
of-connectivity period pc = [t0, t0 + T]—let C(pc) denote
those 2f + 1 processes. Therefore, because there are 3f + 1
processes, there must be a correct process, say r, and a proof-
of-connectivity period pc = [tj , tj+T] at pj such that: (1) r is
in the intersection of B and C(pc) (there must be at least one
correct process in that intersection because it is of size f+1);
and such that (2) pj received m during pc from r, which sent
it at most by td + 2T. Therefore, pj must have delivered by
t+ 3T.
Lemma 6 (Agreement). If some correct process pi delivers
m, then all correct processes eventually deliver m.
Proof outline. This is a straightforward consequence of
Lemma 5.
Lemma 7 (Timeliness). If a correct process pi broadcasts m
at real time t, then no correct process delivers m after t+3T.
Proof outline. This is a straightforward consequence of
Lemma 5.
APPENDIX C
PROOF OF THEOREM 2
Recall that since Algorithm A implements interactive con-
sistency, then when A eventually terminates all correct pro-
cesses will have the same vector of proposals where the values
relative to correct processes are indeed what these correct
processes have proposed. In fact interactive consistency [4]
guarantees the two following properties:
IC.1 The non-faulty processors compute exactly the same
vector.
IC.2 The element of this vector corresponding to a given non-
faulty processor is the private value of that processor.
We now prove Thm. 2, i.e., that assuming algorithm A im-
plements interactive consistency in a known bounded number
of communication rounds (this is used to prove Lemma 11),
as well as Assumptions 1 and 2, then A implements RTBC
(see Sec. V-A) in our system model (see Sec. III).
Lemma 8 (RTBC-Termination). Every correct process even-
tually decides.
Proof outline. By Assumption 1, a correct process pi accesses
the network only through the RTBRB primitive. Therefore,
because pi is correct and therefore does not enter passive
mode while executing RTBRB, it must terminate. By IC.1 pi
must compute a vector. Finally, pi will apply the deterministic
function described in Assumption 2 to that vector to obtain a
value v, which is the value pi decides upon.
Lemma 9 (RTBC-Agreement). No two correct processes
decide differently.
Proof outline. Let pi be a correct process that decides upon
a value vi, and pj be a correct process that decides upon a
value vj . Again, by Assumption 1, pi and pj must not enter
passive mode while using the RTBRB primitive. By IC.1, pi
and pj must compute the same vector V . Both pi and pj apply
the deterministic function described in Assumption 2 to this
vector V . Therefore, vi must be equal to vj .
Lemma 10 (RTBC-Validity). If all correct processes propose
the same value v, then any correct process that decides,
decides v. Otherwise, a correct process may only decide a
value that was proposed by some correct process or the special
value ⊥.
Proof outline. First, note that by Assumption 1, correct pro-
cesses must not enter passive mode while using the RTBRB
primitive. Now, if all correct processes propose the same value
v, then by IC.2 the obtained interactive consistency vector
computed by a correct process should contain v a number
of times equal to the number of correct processes, i.e., at
least 2f + 1 times. Finally, since all correct processes apply
the deterministic function described in Assumption 2 to their
vectors, they must all decide on v.
Let us now assume that not all correct processes propose the
same value v. If a correct process p decides upon a value v′
then by Assumption 2, it must be that either (1) its interactive
consistency vector contains at least 2f + 1 times this value
v′; or (2) that v′ is the special value ⊥. In case v′ appears
2f + 1 times in p’s interactive consistency vector, then by
IC.2, it must be that v′ was proposed by a correct process.
This concludes the proof.
Lemma 11 (RTBC-Timeliness). If a correct process pi pro-
poses a value to consensus at time t, then no correct process
decides after t+ ∆C.
Proof outline. The way we implement consensus is first by
reaching interactive consistency and applying a deterministic
function after. The deterministic function is a computational
load that requires scanning the consistency vector and hence
has a known bounded duration since we assume that correct
processes are synchronous. Therefore, it is sufficient to prove
that the interactive consistency protocol finishes in a bounded
duration (in the sense that correct processes compute their
interactive consistency vectors in a bounded amount of time).
Recall that we assume that Algorithm A requires a bounded
number of communication rounds to terminate, say k. By
Assumption 1 processes send and receive messages over the
network only via the RTBRB primitive. Hence any commu-
nication round has a bounded duration, that being a multiple,
say m, of ∆R, the duration needed by the RTBRB primitive
to complete (which is at most 3T). Therefore, because by
Assumption 1, correct processes must not enter passive mode
while using the RTBRB primitive, it must be that correct
processes will decide before t+(k×m×3T), which concludes
our proof.
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APPENDIX D
REAL-TIME BYZANTINE-RESILIENT ATOMIC BROADCAST
A. Reduction to RTBAB
To prove Thm. 3, we only have to prove that Algorithm A
satisfies the RTBAB-Timeliness property.
Proof outline. Let us assume that the correct process pi
RTBAB-broadcasts m at time t. We have to prove that no
correct process RTBAB-delivers m after real time t + ∆A,
for some ∆A. We prove this by proving the stronger result
that there exists a ∆A such that all correct processes RTBAB-
deliver m by t+ ∆A.
By Property 1, pi RTBRB-broadcasts m with some se-
quence number seqt by time t + ∆B . By RTBRB-Validity,
RTBRB-Timeliness and RTBRB-Agreement, all correct pro-
cesses RTBRB-deliver m by some time t + ∆B + ∆R. By
Property 2, all correct processes will RTBC-propose or RTBC-
decide m by t+ ∆B + ∆R + ∆P .
If one correct process RTBC-decides m by t+ ∆B + ∆R +
∆P , then by the RTBC properties, all correct processes will
RTBC-decide by t+∆B +∆R +∆P +∆C, and by Property 4,
they will RTBAB-deliver by t+ ∆B + ∆R + ∆P + ∆C + ∆D,
which concludes our proof. Therefore, let us now consider the
case where they all RTBC-propose m by t+ ∆B + ∆R + ∆P .
However, it might be that they RTBC-propose m in different
RTBC instances. We want to prove that there will be an RTBC
instance instm where “enough” correct nodes RTBC-propose
m at that instance, by time t+∆m (for some fixed ∆m), so that
it results in instm deciding m. Then, by RTBC-Termination,
RTBC-Agreement, RTBC-Timeliness, and Property 4, we can
conclude that all correct processes RTBAB-deliver m by time
t+ ∆m + ∆C + ∆D. Let us now prove that such an instance
instm indeed exists.
Because all correct processes RTBC-propose m by t+∆B+
∆R + ∆P , there must be a greatest instance instg such that
a correct process pg RTBC-proposes m at some time tk ≤
t+ ∆B + ∆R + ∆P . Now, either (1) m was RTBC-decided at
a prior instance instp (by all correct processes, by the RTBC
properties), or (2) not. In case it was (i.e., case (1)), all correct
processes must have RTBC-decided m by time t+∆B+∆R+
∆P +∆C by the RTBC properties and because instp must have
been dealt with by pg before instg by Property 6. Now, by
Property 4, it must be that all correct processes must have
RTBAB-delivered m by time t+ ∆B + ∆R + ∆P + ∆C.
Let us now focus on case (2), i.e., m was not RTBC-decided
at a prior instance. By Property 3, correct processes must be
RTBC-proposing either m or ⊥ at instance instg . Let us prove
that they cannot propose ⊥, in which case we conclude using
RTBC-Validity and Property 4, and ∆A is again t+∆B+∆R+
∆P + ∆C. We prove that correct processes cannot propose ⊥
at instance instg by contradiction. Let us assume that some
correct process pj votes for ⊥ at instance instg (therefore, pj
cannot be pg). By definition of instg , it must be that pj votes
for m at a prior instance instp. Because it is an instance prior
to instp, as mentioned above, m was not RTBC-decided at
that instance. Therefore, by Property 3, and RTBC-Validity,
it must be that this instance ended up in ⊥ being decided.
Finally, we obtain a contradiction from the fact that pj must
also RTBC-propose m at instance instg , which we prove by
induction on the list of instances between instp and instg and
using Property 5.
B. PISTIS-AT: a Class of Algorithms Implementing RTBAB
Algorithm 3 provides an example of a PISTIS-AT al-
gorithm, which implements the RTBAB primitive presented
in Sec. V-B. We assume here that a process broadcasts
a message by invoking RTBAB-broadcast(), and deliv-
ers a message invoking RTBAB-deliver(). In addition,
RTBAB-init(rtbab) instantiates a new instance of RTBAB
with id rtbab. To guarantee total order, each process maintains
a monotonically increasing sequence number seq , which is
incremented every time RTBAB-broadcast() is called.
Lemma 12. Given an RTBAB instance inst , such that pi is the
leader of inst , all correct processes will either RTBC-propose
a value received from pi or ⊥ (in case they have not received
any new message from pi since the last one they processed).
Moreover, given two correct processes that RTBC-propose
such values at instance inst , it must be that either those values
are equal (to the kth new value broadcasted by pi, for some k)
or one of them is ⊥ (in case the corresponding process has not
received pi’s kth broadcasted new value yet, and has already
processed all previous broadcasted value from pi).
Proof outline. This can be proved by induction on causal time.
The first time those correct processes RTBC-propose a value
at an instance such that pi is the leader, it must be that either
this value is the first value RTBAB-broadcasted by pi, or ⊥.
The inductive case goes as follows: we assume that our
property is true at a given instance inst such that pi is the
leader, and where correct processes RTBC-propose either v
(the (k− 1)th new value proposed by pi) or ⊥, and we prove
that the property is still true at the next such instance inst ′. By
RTBC-Validity, it must be that correct processes either RTBC-
decide v or ⊥, and by RTBC-Agreement, they must not decide
differently. Therefore, if they decide v at instance inst , then v
will be added to the delivered set, and therefore never added
to unordered again; and in addition, it will be removed from
unordered . At the next instance inst ′, these processes will
vote either for the kth new value proposed by pi or for ⊥ if
they have not received that kth new value. In particular, if one
of those correct processes RTBC-proposed ⊥ because it had
not received v yet, then at instance inst ′ it will either propose
the kth new value proposed by pi (since v is skipped because
already delivered), or ⊥ in case it has not received this kth
new value yet. Otherwise if they decide ⊥, then the correct
processes that voted for v will still vote for v at inst ′, and
those that voted for ⊥ will either keep on voting for ⊥ if they
still have not received v, or finally receive v and start voting
for v. Note that by RTBAB-Agreement, all correct processes
must eventually receive v.
In order to obtain time bounds that do not depend on
Algorithm 3’s variable, we make the following assumption:
Assumption 3. Correct processes wait for ∆R + ∆W + (n ×
(∆C + ∆W)) between two different broadcasts.
As we will see below, this is the time it takes to guar-
antee that all correct processes RTBAB-deliver an RTBRB-
broadcasted value.
Lemma 13. Algorithm 3 satisfies Property 1.
Proof outline. Property 1 holds because Algorithm 3 RTBTB-
broadcasts messages on each call to RTBAB-broadcast
(see lines 5 and 6 of Algorithm 3).
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Lemma 14. Algorithm 3 satisfies Property 4.
Proof outline. If a value v (different from ⊥) is RTBC-
decided at time t, and the RTBC instance is the current
instance, and v is not in delivered , then it is RTBAB-delivered.
If v is in delivered , then it must be that it was added to that
set in the past, in which case it was delivered at that time.
Now, if the RTBC instance is not the current instance,
Algorithm 3 retries handling the messages after a while. The
number of times a process will retry handling deliver messages
is bounded because instances are handled in a monotonic order
and are bounded in time according to RTBC-Timeliness.
Lemma 15. Under Assumption 3, Algorithm 3 satisfies Prop-
erty 2.
Proof outline. First of all, let us point out that RTBRB-deliver
messages are treated in monotonic order. Let us now con-
sider three cases. In the following, we first provide variable-
dependent bounds, and we then explain how to get independent
bounds using Assumption 3.
Case (1): Whenever a process pi receives a RTBRB-deliver
message m at time t with sequence number num , broadcasted
by pj , which is the next one to receive (i.e., num = next [pj ]),
and if m is not already in delivered , then pi will append
m to its unordered [pj ] list. We now have to prove that m
will then be RTBC-proposed or RTBC-decided by some time
t + ∆P , for some bounded ∆P . Because m is now in pi’s
unordered [pj ] list, the event line 18 will be triggered at least
until m is removed from the list. Because Algorithm 3 uses
the rotating coordinator paradigm, then a value broadcasted
by some process pk is voted upon using an RTBC instance
only every n (the total number of processes) instances (i.e.,
whenever pk is the leader). However, there might be other
values before m in the unordered [pj ] lists maintained by
the processes. The processes have to RTBC-decide these
previous values to start RTBC-proposing m if m has not been
RTBAB-delivered in the meantime (otherwise we can conclude
because RTBAB-delivered messages are RTBC-decided upon).
Because of the rotating coordinator scheme, and by the RTBC
properties and Lemma 12, we get the guarantee that m will be
RTBC-proposed by t+ (n× (∆C + ∆W)× (num + 1)), where
∆C + ∆W is the time it takes to complete an RTBC instance,
and n × (∆C + ∆W) is the time it takes to rotate through the
leaders (∆W is the time processes wait for before re-trying to
handle a message—see line 15 and line 36). Now, thanks to
Assumption 3, we can derive that all previous values stored in
unordered [pj ] have already been decided upon when correct
processes deliver m. Therefore, we get that m will be RTBC-
proposed by t+ (n× (∆C + ∆W)).
Case (2): If m is already in delivered , then pi must have
already RTBC-decided m according to lines 28–31.
Case (3): If m is not the next value that pi is supposed to
receive, it will re-try RTBRB-delivering m after ∆W until it
has received all the previous values. The RTBRB properties
guarantee that if some correct process pj broadcasts a value v
at time t, then correct processes will deliver v by t+∆R+∆W.
Therefore, it must be that correct processes will have stored
m (and all previous values) in their unordered [pj ] list by
t + (∆R + ∆W) × (num + 1). Finally, following the same
argument as above, we get that m will be RTBC-proposed by
t+((∆R +∆W)× (num +1))+(n× (∆C +∆W)× (num +1)).
As mentioned above, thanks to Assumption 3, we can derive
that all previous values stored in unordered [pj ] have already
been RTBRB-delivered and RTBC-decided upon when correct
processes deliver m. Therefore, we get that m will be RTBC-
proposed by t+ ((∆R + ∆W)) + (n× (∆C + ∆W)).
Lemma 16. Algorithm 3 satisfies Property 3.
Proof outline. This is a straightforward consequence of
Lemma 12.
Lemma 17. Algorithm 3 satisfies Property 5.
Proof outline. Let pi be a correct process that proposes a value
v, with broadcaster pj , at a given time t, using a given RTBC
instance inst , and such that this instance does not decide
v. By Lemma 12, all correct processes propose v or ⊥ at
that instance. By the RTBC properties, because inst does not
decide v, it must decide ⊥. Therefore, pi will increment its
RTBC instance number but will keep m at the head of its
unordered [pj ] list. After a full rotation through the leaders,
it will RTBC-propose v again at the later instance inst + n,
where 0 < n.
Moreover, no correct process will propose v between inst
and inst +n because pj (v’s broadcaster) is the leader of inst
and inst + n but not of the instances in between, and v can
only be in the unordered [pj ] lists.
Lemma 18. Algorithm 3 satisfies Property 6.
Proof outline. By design, correct processes RTBC-propose
exactly one value per RTBC instance because they only start
proposing a value in a new instance if busy is False; in
which case they set busy to True; wait for this instance to
complete; and finally increment the RTBC instance number
and set back busy to False.
Correct processes propose values in all RTBC instances and
monotonically because they increment the the RTBC instance
number by one every time an RTBC instance complete.
Finally, correct processes do not run RTBC instances in
parallel thanks to the busy flag.
C. Direct Proof of Algorithm 3’s Correctness
Lemma 19 (RTBAB-Validity). If a correct pi process broad-
casts m, then pi eventually delivers m.
Proof outline. By RTBRB-Validity, pi eventually delivers m
with sequence number num . If pi has already delivered m,
i.e., m ∈ delivered , then we are done. Otherwise, because
pi broadcasts messages monotonically (and without gaps), it
will append m to its list of unordered messages (line 13
of Algorithm 3). Therefore, line 18 will be triggered until
m is removed from the list, as long as pi eventually resets
busy to False once it has set it to True, which is true by
RTBC-termination. When finally pi is the leader of its current
instance, say inst1, and that m is at the head of pi’s unordered
list, pi will RTBC-propose m. By RTBC-Validity, either all the
correct processes RTBC-propose m, in which case pi delivers
m; or some correct processes RTBC-propose values different
from m. As mentioned above, such proposed values must then
be ⊥, in which case pi might RTBC-decide m or ⊥. Again
as mentioned above, if pi does not deliver m, it will again
either decide m or ⊥ at the next instance where it is the
leader. Because by RTBAB-Agreement, all correct processes
eventually receive m, it must be that eventually, pi RTBC-
decides m for an instance where it is the leader, and in turn
RTBAB-deliver m.
Lemma 20 (RTBAB-No duplication). No message is delivered
more than once.
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Proof outline. This property straightforwardly follows triv-
ially from the fact that delivered values are added to the
delivered set line 31, and from the fact that a process always
checks whether it has delivered a message m before delivering
m (see line 30).
Lemma 21 (RTBAB-Integrity). If some correct process de-
livers a message m with initial sender pi and process pi is
correct, then m was previously broadcast by pi.
Proof outline. First of all, the RTBAB-delivered value m
(which must be different from ⊥) with sender pi (i.e., such that
pi is the leader of the current instance) must have been RTBC-
decided upon. By RTBC-Agreement and RTBC-Termination,
it must be that the correct sender pi has also RTBC-decided
upon m. It must be that m was it pi’s own unordered list.
Therefore, it must be that pi RTBRB-delivered m. Finally, by
RTBRB-Integrity, it must be that pi previously broadcasted
m.
Lemma 22 (RTBAB-Agreement). If some message m is
delivered by any correct process, then every correct process
eventually delivers m.
Proof outline. Let pi be the process that RTBAB-delivered m
at instance inst , such that pl is the leader of that instance.
This delivered value must be different from ⊥, and must have
been RTBC-decided upon. By RTBC-Agreement and RTBC-
Termination, it must be that all correct processes eventually
RTBC-decide m as well. Let pj be one such correct process.
Lemma 23 (variable-dependent RTBAB-Timeliness). There
exists a known ∆A such that if a correct process pi broadcasts
m at time t, no correct process delivers m after real time t+
∆A, where ∆A depends on seqt, the current sequence number
at the time m is broadcasted.
Proof outline. Timeliness follows from RTBRB-Timeliness
and RTBC-Timeliness, as well as of the fact that Algorithm 3
rotates through the processes (processes might have to wait a
full rotation before they get a chance to decide on a messages
that was RTBAB-broadcasted). Let ∆C be the time it takes
for all correct processes to decide on a value using RTBC
(see RTBC-Timeliness). Let ∆R be the time it takes for all
correct processes to deliver a message using RTBRB (which
exists by RTBRB-Timeliness). Assume that pi assigns the
sequence number seqt with the message m. As mentioned
above, we assume that pi RTBAB-broadcasts m at time t.
Because correct processes might still be RTBRB-delivering
messages when they gets the RTBRB-deliver message for m,
they might not be able to RTBRB-deliver m right away (it
might be that seqt > next [pi]). However, we are guaranteed
that all correct processes will have delivered m by time
T1 = t + ((∆R + ∆W) × (seqt + 1)) (where ∆W is the time
processes wait for before re-trying to handle a message—see
line 15 and line 36). Note that at that time, processes might
be RTBAB-delivering other messages broadcasted by other
processes than pi. Also, there might already be some messages
from pi to RTBAB-deliver before m (all those with sequence
We have to prove that pj RTBAB-delivers m also at instance
inst . By RTBRB-Agreement, it must be that pj eventually
receives the same broadcasts as pi, among other things, those
for which pl is the leader. From RTBC-Agreement and RTBC-
Termination, it must be that all correct processes eventually
decide the same values for each RTBC instance. Therefore,
pj will eventually reach instance inst , and will therefore also
RTBAB-deliver m.
numbers less than seqt). In case pi is currently not the leader,
it might have to wait a full rotation through the processes to get
a chance to be the leader again. Given the fact that all correct
processes have m in their unordered list by time T1, a full ro-
tation will take at most n×(∆C+∆W). Because processes might
have to process seqt messages from pi before they get a chance
to process m, it follows that m will be RTBAB-delivered by
t+((∆R+∆W)×(seqt+1))+(n×(∆C+∆W)×(seqt+1)).
Lemma 24 (RTBAB-Timeliness). Under Assumption 3, there
exists a known ∆A such that if a correct process pi broadcasts
m at time t, no correct process delivers m after real time t+
∆A.
Proof outline. Using Assumption 3 and a proof similar to
the one of Lemma 23, we derive that messages RTBAB-
broadcasted at time t are RTBAB-delivered by t+(∆R+∆W+
(n× (∆C + ∆W))).
Lemma 25 (RTBAB-Total order). Let m1 and m2 be any
two messages and suppose that pi and pj are any two correct
processes that deliver m1 and m2. If pi delivers m1 before
m2, then pj delivers m1 before m2.
Proof outline. Because pi RTBAB-delivers m1 before m2, it
must have RTBC-decided m1 at an instance inst1 and m2 at an
instance inst2 such that inst1 < inst2. By RTBC-Agreement
and RTBC-Termination, pj must also have RTBC-decided m1
at inst1 and m2 at inst2. Using a similar argument as in
the proof of RTBAB-Agreement, we derive that pj must then
also have RTBAB-delivered m1 at instance inst1 and m2 at
inst2.
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